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Benjamin J. Steinberg* & Dwayne Antonio Robinson** 
Abstract 
The traditional economic loss rule precludes plaintiffs—such as those 
affected by the BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill—from recovering losses 
not resulting from damage to person or property. Most states have applied 
the rule to various circumstances and have carved out several exceptions 
over time, including one for commercial fishermen. In the Florida Supreme 
Court’s decision in Curd v. Mosaic Fertilizer, LLC,1 the court expanded 
the duty element in negligence to new reaches for claims of pure economic 
loss. As a result, Florida now unquestionably promises the greatest 
opportunity compared to the other Gulf states for recovery of pure 
economic losses due to the negligence of a polluter such as Mosaic 
Fertilizer or BP. The issue that remains unclear after Curd is whether and 
how far this newly stated duty will extend beyond commercial fishermen to 
parties such as distributors, restaurants, fisheries, and fish brokers.  
This Article provides a brief background of the pure economic loss rule 
and its application in Florida, pre- and post-Curd. The Article also 
provides the first in-depth analysis of the treatment of the pure economic 
loss rule in each of the Gulf states—Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, and 
Texas—as well as their applicable federal circuits. The analysis illustrates 
that Florida’s rule, following Curd, is the most amenable to plaintiffs. In 
the end, it is unclear just how far the holding in Curd may stretch or limit 
the economic loss rule in Florida and how much litigation will see the 
inside of a courthouse based on Curd’s precedent. 
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INTRODUCTION 
On April 20, 2010, an explosion lacerated the Deepwater Horizon oil 
rig, beginning the largest accidental oil spill in the history of the petroleum 
industry.2 Initial leakage estimates ranged from 1,000 to 19,000 barrels per 
day.3 The first study of the spill performed by a peer-reviewed journal 
concluded that the oil began flowing at a rate of approximately 56,000 
barrels per day, eventually leaking approximately 4.4 million barrels of 
crude oil into the Gulf of Mexico.4 Businesses and individuals who relied 
on Gulf waters for their livelihoods were hit extremely hard.5 Although BP 
                                                                                                                     
 2. NAT’L COMM’N ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL & OFFSHORE DRILLING, REPORT 
TO THE PRESIDENT, DEEP WATER: THE GULF OIL DISASTER AND THE FUTURE OF OFFSHORE DRILLING, 
at vi (2011), available at http://www.oilspillcommission.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ 
DEEPWATER_ReporttothePresident_FINAL.pdf; Campbell Robertson & Clifford Krauss, Gulf 
Spill Is the Largest of Its Kind, Scientists Say, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 2010, at A14. 
 3. Kevin Krajick et al., The Earth Institute at Columbia University, Study Affirms Gulf Oil 
Spill’s Vastness (Sep. 23, 2010), www.earthinstitute.columbia.edu/articles/view/2730 (citing 
Timothy J. Crone & Maya Tolstoy, Magnitude of the 2010 Gulf of Mexico Oil Leak, 330 SCIENCE 
MAG. 634, 634 (2010)). 
 4. Id. 
 5. See Susan Buchanan, Fishermen Clinging to Livelihoods During Spill Recovery, LA. 
WEEKLY, Nov. 22, 2010. 
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established a fund to help those affected, resistance and difficulty have 
plagued many who attempt to receive fund benefits.6 Already, a vast 
number of individual and class-action claims have been filed against BP 
for the company’s apparent failures in managing the distribution of fund 
benefits.7 
During the time that the Deepwater Horizon oil spill was consuming 
the daily news cycle, the Florida Supreme Court handed down a landmark 
decision that may have turned Florida into a favorable jurisdiction for those 
affected by the spill. In Curd v. Mosaic Fertilizer, LLC,8 the Florida 
Supreme Court gutted a key restriction to plaintiffs’ recovery of pure 
economic losses. Beyond merely recognizing a commercial fishermen 
exception to the economic loss rule9—a far from radical proposition—the 
Florida Supreme Court, in a lawsuit alleging negligence, also held that the 
polluter owed a duty of care to those who fell within the “zone of risk”10 
the polluter created. This extension of duty, as one Florida justice warned 
in a separate opinion,11 has the potential to create a Cardozian nightmare of 
“liability in an indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time to an 
indeterminate class.”12 
The traditional economic loss rule precludes plaintiffs—such as 
Howard Curd, a commercial fisherman, and those affected by the BP 
spill—from recovering losses not resulting from damage to person or 
property.13 A major justification for applying the rule to common law 
negligence claims is the classic “floodgates” argument famously articulated 
by Chief Judge Benjamin Cardozo. In his opinion in Ultramares Corp. v. 
Touche,14 Judge Cardozo warned that the duty element of common law 
negligence must have boundaries for fear of subjecting a tortfeasor to the 
aforementioned indeterminate liability to an indeterminate class.15 Most 
states have applied the rule to various circumstances and have carved out 
several exceptions over time, including one for commercial fishermen. 
After the Florida Supreme Court’s decision in Curd, Florida now 
unquestionably promises the greatest chances for recovery of pure 
economic losses due to the negligence of a polluter such as Mosaic 
Fertilizer or BP when compared to the other Gulf states.16 
                                                                                                                     
 6. Brian Skoloff, Problems Plague BP Compensation Fund, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Oct. 6, 
2010, available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/39525091/ns/us_news-life/. 
 7. Steven Mufson & Juliet Eilperin, Lawyers Lining Up for Class-Action Suits Over Oil 
Spill, WASH. POST, May 17, 2010, at A01, available at http://washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/ 
article/2010/05/16/AR2010051603254.html?sub=AR. 
 8. 39 So. 3d 1216 (Fla. 2010). 
 9. Id. at 1223. 
 10. Id. at 1228. 
 11. Id. at 1232 (Polston, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 12. Id. (quoting Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441, 444 (N.Y. 1931)). 
 13. Id. at 1223–24 (citing Union Oil Co. v. Oppen, 501 F.2d 558, 563 (9th Cir. 1974)). 
 14. 174 N.E. 441 (N.Y. 1931). 
 15. Id. at 444. 
 16. See infra Part III (conducting a state-by-state and circuit-by-circuit analysis of the pure 
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The issue that remains unclear after Curd—which involved a class 
broader than one comprising solely commercial fishermen—is just how far 
this newly stated duty will extend. Florida Supreme Court Justice Ricky 
Polston addressed this issue in a separate opinion.17 Concurring in part and 
dissenting in part, Justice Polston recognized that while the court’s opinion 
purported to address only the claims of “commercial fishermen,” the 
plaintiffs’ proposed class was broader and included “all fishermen and 
those persons engaged in the commercial catch and sale of fish.”18 Justice 
Polston opined that “the majority’s decision does not extend to distributors, 
seafood restaurants, fisheries, fish brokers, or the like who may have been 
affected by Mosaic’s pollution.”19 However, the majority opinion is far 
from explicit on that point. Rather, it provides a roadmap for such 
prospective plaintiffs’ claims.20 Therefore, it seems a foregone conclusion 
that the majority’s opinion will be put to the test by future, non-fishermen 
plaintiffs.  
What if a distributor, seafood restaurant, fishery, fish broker, or the like 
asked a Florida court to award damages for purely economic losses 
suffered as a result of a polluter such as BP? In Louisiana, a very popular 
chef filed suit against BP for the economic losses she incurred as a result of 
the Deepwater Horizon spill.21 Could that chef rely on Curd were her 
restaurant in Florida? What about other businesses that rely on the 
waterways or claim economic losses from a decline in tourism-related 
business as a result of the spill?22 Just how far will the duty extend? And 
how will Florida determine the “indeterminate class”? 
Part I of this Article provides a brief background of the pure economic 
loss rule and its application in Florida, including an analysis of pre-Curd 
Florida precedent evidencing the evolution and eventual diminishment of 
the economic loss rule. Part II analyzes the Curd case—its facts, 
                                                                                                                     
economic loss rule’s application in the Gulf States).  
 17. Curd, 39 So. 3d 1216 at 1228 (Polston, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 18. Id. at 1229 (quoting Petitioner’s Fourth Amended Complaint) (“As an initial matter, I 
note that the majority decides the case for a more narrow class than those bringing the suit and more 
narrowly than the claims they allege.”) 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. at 1227–28 (majority opinion) (analyzing the elements of negligence under Florida 
law and establishing the element of duty, which is at the center of the traditional economic loss 
rule); see also infra Section II.C. 
 21. Dennis Persica, The Times-Picayune, Chef Susan Spicer Sues BP, Others Over Oil Spill 
in Gulf of Mexico, TIMES-PICAYUNENOLA.COM (New Orleans, La.), June 27, 2010, 
http://www.nola.com/news/gulf-oil-spill/index.ssf/2010/06/chef_susan_spicer_sues_bp_othe.h tml. 
Chef Susan Spicer is not the first chef or restaurateur to file suit against BP. Id. However, while the 
majority of these suits are aimed only at establishing the right to collect from the claims fund 
established by BP, Chef Spicer is also seeking direct money damages against BP. Id. 
 22. See the U.S. Travel Association’s report on the Gulf spill for an in-depth analysis of the 
potential long-term impact on tourism as a result of the Deepwater Horizon oil spill. OXFORD ECON. 
FOR THE U.S. TRAVEL ASS’N, POTENTIAL IMPACT OF THE GULF OIL SPILL ON TOURISM (2010), 
available at http://www.bpgulfoilspilllawsuit.com/supporting-studies/117-oxford-economics-
potential-impact-of-the-gulf-oil-spill-on-tourism. 
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procedural history, and the opinion of the Florida Supreme Court. 
Additionally, Part II examines and addresses the concerns Justice Polston 
expressed in his separate opinion. Lastly, Part II analogizes the holding in 
Curd to the potential claims available to those affected by the BP spill and 
other plaintiffs adversely affected by polluters. Part III provides the first in-
depth analysis of the treatment of the pure economic loss rule in each of 
the Gulf states—Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Texas—as well as 
their applicable federal circuits. The analysis illustrates that Florida’s rule, 
following Curd, is the most amenable to plaintiff claims. In the end, it is 
unclear just how far the holding in Curd may stretch the economic loss rule 
(or lack thereof) in Florida and how much litigation will see the inside of a 
courthouse based on Curd’s precedent.  
I.  THE FOUNDATION OF THE PURE ECONOMIC LOSS RULE AND ITS 
HISTORY IN FLORIDA 
Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint23 is the seminal case in 
American jurisprudence establishing the common law pure economic loss 
rule. The plaintiffs in Robins were charterers of a vessel that the defendant 
carelessly damaged during an inspection.24 When there were delays 
because of the necessary repairs, the plaintiffs incurred lost profits because 
of their inability to sail as planned.25 The plaintiffs’ claims sounded in 
negligence and sought recovery for purely economic losses.26 In an opinion 
written by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes,27 the U.S. Supreme Court 
denied recovery to the plaintiffs for those purely economic losses because 
they had no proprietary interest in the damaged vessel.28 Justice Holmes’ 
opinion established the bright-line rule that tort liability cannot derive from 
pure economic loss.29 
Despite being a decision in admiralty, lower courts have since applied 
the Robins decision to claims of common law negligence.30 Barber Lines 
A/S v. M/V DonauMaru31 provides an example of a court applying the 
Robins rule in a case with facts similar to those in Curd. The ship 
DonauMaru spilled fuel into Boston Harbor and caused damage to a dock 
                                                                                                                     
 23. 275 U.S. 303 (1927). 
 24. Id. at 307. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. at 303. 
 28. Id. at 309–10. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Some scholars argue that the prevailing understanding of Justice Holmes’ opinion is 
flawed; the opinion does not, in fact, establish a special rule for pure economic loss. See Peter 
Benson, The Problem with Pure Economic Loss, 60 S.C. L. REV. 823, 826, 878 (2009) (providing 
an in-depth analysis of the Robins decision, the economic loss rule, and a proposition that the 
dominant approach to pure economic loss is flawed). 
 31. 764 F.2d 50 (1st Cir. 1985). 
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owned by a third party.32 The damaged dock made it impossible for 
another ship, the Tamara, to dock.33 When the Tamara was forced to dock 
and unload its cargo elsewhere, its owners incurred significant additional 
costs for fuel, docking, and labor.34 After the trial court dismissed the 
plaintiffs’ claim, the First Circuit affirmed the judgment and held that 
“controlling case law denies that a plaintiff can recover damages for 
negligently caused financial harm, even when foreseeable, except in special 
circumstances.”35 The court then stated that the “most common” special 
circumstance is “physical injury to the plaintiffs or to their property.”36 
Echoing the floodgates sentiment of Chief Judge Cardozo in Ultramares, 
the First Circuit illustrated the effect of reversing the lower court using a 
hypothetical “downtown auto accident.” Liability would attach for the 
damages suffered by not only the few people who may have been 
physically hurt, but also the hundreds more who experienced damages due 
to the subsequent traffic delay.37 The court acknowledged that the Robins 
precedent may have seen its time pass based on more recent 
jurisprudence.38 Nonetheless, the court concluded that it could not reverse 
the “general judicial principle that (with exceptions) forbids recoveries for 
negligently caused purely financial losses.”39 
Lest it be thought that Barber Lines signaled a modern strict adherence 
to the traditional rule, the reality has been quite the opposite. Courts have 
carved out exceptions to the blanket no-liability roots of the rule, and the 
majority of states and jurisdictions have recently retreated from such harsh 
results for plaintiffs.40 Florida is no different, and the evolution of the 
traditional rule has led to the Florida Supreme Court narrowing its 
application to only a few circumstances. The cases of AFM Corp. v. 
Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co.,41 Casa Clara Condominium 
Ass’n, Inc. v. Charley Toppino and Sons, Inc.,42 and Indemnity Insurance 
Co. of North America v. American Aviation, Inc.,43 provide a clear history 
                                                                                                                     
 32. Id. at 50. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. at 51 (emphasis added). 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. at 54 (“The typical downtown auto accident, that harms a few persons physically and 
physically damages the property of several others, may well cause financial harm (e.g., through 
delay) to a vast number of potential plaintiffs.”). 
 38. Id. at 53. 
 39. Id. at 57. 
 40. See Union Oil Co. v. Oppen, 501 F.2d 558, 566–67 & n.9 (9th Cir. 1974) (recognizing 
cases where economic losses have been “recovered for the negligence of pension consultants, 
accountants, architects, attorneys, notaries public, test hole drillers, title abstractors, termite 
inspectors, soil engineers, surveyors, real estate brokers, drawers of checks, directors of 
corporations, trustees, bailees and public weighers”). 
 41. 515 So. 2d 180 (Fla. 1987). 
 42. 620 So. 2d 1244 (Fla. 1993). 
 43. 891 So. 2d 532 (Fla. 2004). 
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of how the rule has been adopted, adapted, and eventually narrowed for 
claims of negligence in Florida. 
A.  AFM Corp. v. Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co.: 
Strict Adherence 
In AFM Corp., the plaintiff entered into a Yellow Pages advertising 
agreement with Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Company.44 
Between the execution of the contract and the placement of the 
advertisements, the plaintiff moved offices and changed phone numbers in 
order to use an automatic phone referral system.45 When the Yellow Pages 
were eventually distributed, the plaintiff’s old telephone number was 
printed in the advertisement—a number that was, in the interim, assigned 
to another Southern Bell customer who promptly disconnected the referral 
system.46 After more mistakes on the part of Southern Bell, the plaintiff 
sued and asserted a claim for economic losses based solely on a theory of 
tort and common law negligence.47 In its review, the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Eleventh Circuit certified questions to the Florida Supreme Court, 
which then consolidated them into a single question: Does “Florida permit 
a purchaser of services to recover economic losses in tort without a claim 
for personal injury or property damage?”48 
Just months prior to deciding AFM Corp., the Florida Supreme Court 
decided Florida Power & Light Co. v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.,49 
holding that where negligence claims derive from a contract, contract 
principles are better suited than tort principles for remedying pure 
economic losses.50 Although AFM Corp. addressed a contract for services 
while Florida Power & Light addressed the issue in a contract for goods, 
the court reached the same conclusion for both: “[W]ithout some conduct 
resulting in personal injury or property damage, there can be no 
independent tort flowing from a contractual breach which would justify a 
tort claim solely for economic losses.”51 The sole remedy, therefore, is in 
contract law, and the court unquestionably held that the economic loss rule 
in Florida applies to claims sounded in contract.  
 
 
 
                                                                                                                     
 44. AFM Corp., 515 So. 2d at 180. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. at 180–81. 
 47. Id. at 181. 
 48. Id. at 180. 
 49. 510 So. 2d 899 (Fla. 1987). 
 50. Id. at 902 (stating that the economic loss rule has a “long, historic” basis in Florida). 
 51. AFM Corp., 515 So. 2d at 181–82; see also Heather Howdeshell, Note, Didn’t My 
General Contractor Pay You? Subcontractor Construction Liens in Residential Construction 
Projects, 61 FLA. L. REV. 151, 170 & n.140 (2009). 
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B.  Casa Clara Condominium Ass’n v. Charley Toppino & Sons, Inc.: 
A Noteworthy Dissent 
Nearly six years after AFM Corp., the Florida Supreme Court addressed 
whether a homeowner could recover pure economic losses from a concrete 
provider under a theory of negligence in Casa Clara Condominium 
Ass’n.52 The plaintiffs owned residential units which were built with 
defective concrete supplied by Toppino & Sons, Inc.53 The plaintiffs 
acknowledged the state’s economic loss rule but implored the court to 
create a negligence-based exception to the rule to compensate homeowners 
who have suffered economic losses after a breach of contract for the 
construction of their homes.54 The court again stated that contract—and not 
tort—law was most appropriate for providing any available remedy.55 The 
court also held that the homeowners bargained for finished products—
completed, constructed homes—and not the homes’ individual 
components, such as the concrete. Because the concrete was part and 
parcel of the completed home, the defective concrete caused no damage 
except to the product itself.56 
A prescient dissent by Florida Supreme Court Justice Leander J. Shaw, 
Jr. asserted that contract law was inapplicable because the homeowners 
were not parties to the contract between Toppino and the general contractor 
who constructed the homes.57 Therefore, he argued, it would be imprudent 
to “stretch” the economic loss rule to bar an action by an innocent third 
party who had suffered a foreseeable injury at the hand of a tortfeasor.58 
Justice Shaw essentially suggested shifting the economic loss rule from a 
general rule for which exceptions need be sought to a concept expressly 
limited to certain circumstances. This suggestion of limitation on the rule 
perhaps provided the spark for several more exceptions carved out by the 
Florida Supreme Court in subsequent years. 
C.  Indemnity Insurance Co. of North America v. American Aviation, 
Inc.: Change, but Duty Remains 
In Indemnity Insurance Co. of North America, the Florida Supreme 
Court fell in line with Justice Shaw’s dissent and explicitly limited the 
scope of the economic loss rule.59 There, an aircraft owner and its insurer 
sued American Aviation for damage to the aircraft because of American 
                                                                                                                     
 52. Casa Clara Condo. Ass’n v. Charley Toppino & Sons, Inc., 620 So. 2d 1244 (Fla. 1993). 
 53. Id. at 1245. 
 54. Id. at 1246 (arguing that contract remedies would be burdensome and unfair to 
homeowners). 
 55. Id. at 1247 (quoting Fla. Power & Light Co., 510 So. 2d at 902). 
 56. Id. (applying the precedent that in a product liability claim, no recovery may be had 
unless the defective product causes damage to something or someone other than itself). 
 57. See id. at 1249 (Shaw, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 58. Id.  
 59. Indemnity Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Am. Aviation, Inc., 891 So. 2d 532 (Fla. 2004). 
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Aviation’s “negligent maintenance and inspection of the aircraft’s landing 
gear.”60 No privity existed between the plaintiffs and American Aviation.61 
After receiving five certified questions from the Eleventh Circuit, the 
Florida Supreme Court again consolidated and rephrased the questions into 
a single question: “[W]hether the economic loss doctrine bars a negligence 
action to recover purely economic loss in a case where the defendant is 
neither a manufacturer nor distributor of a product and there is no privity of 
contract.”62 The rephrasing of the question shows how the court aimed to 
limit the scope of the economic loss rule in Florida. 
In its first explicit limitation on the application of the rule, the court 
held that the economic loss rule “bars a negligence action to recover solely 
economic damages only in circumstances where the parties are either in 
contractual privity or the defendant is a manufacturer or distributor of a 
product.”63 Because American Aviation was not a manufacturer or 
distributor of a product and no privity existed between the parties, the 
economic loss rule did not bar the action.64 Until this holding, Florida’s 
highest court had not explicitly established the exclusive circumstances in 
which the economic loss rule remained a valid bar to a negligence claim.65 
In case its holding could be interpreted in any other manner, the court 
clearly stated: “We now agree that the economic loss rule should be 
expressly limited.”66 The court dubbed these limited scenarios as the 
“Contractual Privity Economic Loss Rule”67 and the “Products Liability 
Economic Loss Rule.”68 After partitioning the rule into these two distinct 
classes, the court had little difficulty finding that the facts of the case did 
not fit into either.69 The court expressly overruled AFM Corp. and re-
asserted its opinion from a prior case where it recognized that AFM Corp. 
was “unnecessarily over-expansive in [its] reliance on the economic loss 
rule as opposed to fundamental contractual principles.”70 
The court held that those cases that no longer fit within the scope of the 
rule and its newly articulated categories “should be decided on the 
                                                                                                                     
 60. Id. at 534. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. (quoted material appears in all caps in original). 
 63. Id. (emphasis added). 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. at 536 (“In this state, the economic loss rule has been applied in two different 
circumstances. The first is when the parties are in contractual privity and one party seeks to recover 
damages in tort for matters arising from the contract. The second is when there is a defect in a 
product that causes damage to the product but causes no personal injury or damage to other 
property.”). 
 66. Id. at 542. 
 67. Id. at 536–37. 
 68. Id. at 537–41. 
 69. Id. at 541. 
 70. Id. at 542 (quoting Moransais v. Heathman, 744 So. 2d 973, 981 (Fla.1999)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
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traditional negligence principles of duty, breach, and proximate cause.”71 
In a concurring opinion, Justice Raoul G. Cantero made a point of 
emphasizing this remaining burden of establishing duty.72 To assuage 
concerns of the floodgates opening wide, Justice Cantero stated that “our 
limitation of the rule will not open the gates to widespread tort recovery for 
purely economic losses . . . [because] plaintiffs whose cases fall outside of 
the economic loss rule must still prove ‘duty, breach, and proximate 
cause.’”73 The opinion further stated that when compared to the traditional 
economic loss rule, “[t]he ‘duty’ prong remains a strong filter in these 
cases—virtually as strong as the rule itself.”74 This decision narrowed the 
scope of the economic loss rule, with the court relying on the “duty” 
element of a negligence claim to prevent the Cardozian nightmare.  
II.  CURD V. MOSAIC FERTILIZER, LLC: DUTY EXTENDED AD INFINITUM? 
A.  The Majority Opinion 
On September 5, 2004, nearly six years before anyone had ever heard of 
the Deepwater Horizon oil rig, the Gulf of Mexico around Tampa Bay was 
forever changed when a dyke burst—releasing thousands of gallons of 
acidic wastewater into Hillsborough Bay.75 The Hillsborough County 
Environmental Protection Commission and the Florida Department of 
Environmental Protection warned the owner, Mosaic Fertilizer, LLC, that 
the quantity of wastewater in the pond was dangerously pushing the dyke 
to its limits.76 Nonetheless, Mosaic failed to improve the condition until it 
was too late. Like those suffering after the Deepwater Horizon spill, many 
businesses and individuals who earned their living on Tampa Bay were 
seriously damaged.77 Also like those affected by the Deepwater Horizon 
spill, those who were affected by the toxic pollutants spilled by Mosaic 
promptly initiated litigation. 
One of the fishermen whose livelihood swam in the waters of Tampa 
Bay was Howard Curd.78 Curd is the named plaintiff in a class action 
brought by a broad class against Mosaic Fertilizer to recover for the 
economic losses that they suffered after the spill.79 The trial court 
dismissed the proposed class action, and although Florida’s Second 
                                                                                                                     
 71. Id. at 543. 
 72. Id. at 544 (Cantero, J., concurring). 
 73. Id. (quoting majority opinion at 543). 
 74. Id. at 546. 
 75. Janet Zink et al., Acidic, Radioactive Water Spills Into Bay, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Sept. 
6, 2004, http://www.sptimes.com/2004/09/06/Hillsborough/Acidic__radioactive_w.shtml. 
 76. Petitioners’ Initial Brief at 4, Curd v. Mosaic Fertilizer, LLC, 39 So. 3d 1216 (No. SC08-
1920), 2008 WL 5260712, at *4 (Fla. 2010). 
 77. Id. at 5. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Curd v. Mosaic Fertilizer, LLC, 39 So. 3d 1216 (Fla. 2010). 
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District Court of Appeal affirmed, it certified two questions to the Florida 
Supreme Court as matters of great public importance.80 The first question 
asked, “Does Florida recognize a common law theory under which 
commercial fishermen can recover for economic losses proximately caused 
by the negligent release of pollutants despite the fact that the fishermen do 
not own any property damaged by the pollution?”81 In answering in the 
affirmative, the Florida Supreme Court went further by identifying the 
class of plaintiffs to whom Mosaic owed a duty of care as those who fell 
within the foreseeable “zone of risk.”82 This precedent is striking because 
in applying the malleable “zone of risk” analysis to a class which, as a 
whole, was not limited to commercial fishermen, the court may have paved 
the way for a plethora of future litigation.  
In holding the economic loss rule inapplicable to the facts, Curd was 
unremarkable.83 After all, it merely reiterated the holding in Indemnity 
Insurance Co. of North America and joined the many other jurisdictions 
with an explicit carve-out of the economic loss rule as applied to 
commercial fishermen.84 However, in expanding duty through use of the 
“zone of risk” analysis in a claim for purely economic losses, Curd 
represented nothing short of a landmark extension. 
If prior cases discussed duty as the lock on the floodgates, then the 
Curd court turned the key. After finding traditional negligence principles 
applicable to the claim, the court questioned the district court’s finding that 
the defendant did not owe “an independent duty of care to protect the 
fishermen’s purely economic interests—that is, their expectations of profits 
from fishing for healthy fish.”85 In overturning the district court, the 
Florida Supreme Court held that Mosaic did owe such a duty and that the 
duty “was not shared by the public as a whole.”86 After rationalizing duty 
with the concept of foreseeability, the court recognized that although duty 
may arise from several sources, the catch-all category of “a duty arising 
from the general facts of a case”87 encompassed “that class of cases in 
which the duty arises because of a foreseeable zone of risk arising from the 
acts of the defendant.”88 According to the court, it is this duty that extended 
to Curd and his class. 
The court found that Mosaic’s business of storing pollutants and 
                                                                                                                     
 80. Id. at 1218–19. 
 81. Id. at 1218. 
 82. Id. at 1228. 
 83. See supra Section I.C (recognizing the Florida Supreme Court’s limitation of the 
economic loss rule to only contract and products liability actions). 
 84. See infra Part III. 
 85. Curd, 39 So. 3d. at 1223 (quoting Curd v. Mosaic Fertilizer, LLC, 993 So. 2d 1078, 1083 
(Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2008)). 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. at 1228 (citing Clay Elec. Co-op., Inc. v. Johnson, 873 So. 2d 1182, 1185 (Fla. 2003) 
(citing McCain v. Fla. Power Corp., 593 So. 2d 500, 503 n.2 (Fla. 1992))). 
 88. Id. (quoting McCain, 593 So. 2d at 503 n.2) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
11
Steinberg and Robinson: Making BPs Blood Curd-Le: Duty, Economic Loss, and the Potential
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2011
1256 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 63 
 
chemicals created an appreciable zone of risk and that Mosaic therefore 
was obligated to protect those who may be exposed to the pollutants.89 
Furthermore, the court held that the commercial fishermen had a “special 
interest within that zone of risk, an interest not shared by the general 
community.”90 To support its finding that this interest was “special,” the 
court stated that the fishermen not only relied on the fish in those waters 
for their livelihood, but that they were also licensed by the state to do so.91 
After all of the prologue, the court held Mosaic’s actions “constituted a 
tortious invasion that interfered with the special interest of the commercial 
fisherman to use those public waters to earn their livelihood.”92 The court 
concluded by stating, “We find this breach of duty has given rise to a cause 
of action sounding in negligence.”93 After expanding the reach of the duty 
element beyond the boundaries relied upon for decades as a shield against 
litigation, the Curd court seemingly saw the damages element of a claim as 
a sufficient hurdle to serve the same goal and act as a new shield.94 
B.  Justice Polston: Articulating the Potential Cardozian Nightmare 
Likely due to the jurisdictional limitations inherent in certified 
questions, the majority opinion focused solely on the commercial 
fishermen in Curd’s class.95 However, a separate opinion written by Justice 
Polston proposed that such a limited reading of the holding is perhaps 
myopic. In his view, as to the specific question regarding the negligence 
claim, “the majority decides the case for a more narrow class than those 
bringing the suit and more narrowly than the claims they allege.”96 The true 
class of plaintiffs suing Mosaic included more than merely commercial 
fishermen, and their claims extended far beyond profit losses associated 
with closed waterways or dead fish. The claimants included “all fishermen 
and those persons engaged in the commercial catch and sale of fish,” and 
their pleadings requested broad damages, including damages attributable to 
the resulting harm to their reputation.97 
The good justice, clearly recognizing the dangers inherent in the 
majority’s extension of duty in Curd, attempted to blunt the breadth of the 
                                                                                                                     
 89. Id. (“It was foreseeable that, were these materials released into the public waters, they 
would cause damage to marine and plant life as well as to human activity.” (citing McCain, 593 So. 
2d at 503 n.2)). 
 90. Id. (citing Union Oil Co. v. Oppen, 501 F.2d 558, 568 (9th Cir. 1974)). 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. (“[I]n order to be entitled to compensation for any loss of profits, the commercial 
fishermen must prove all of the elements of their causes of action, including damages.” (emphasis 
added)). 
 95. See FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b) (limiting the appellate jurisdiction of Florida’s supreme 
court, including, as was the case in Curd, addressing certified questions of great public importance); 
see also infra note 123.  
 96. Curd, 39 So. 3d. at 1229 (Polston, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 97. Id. (quoting Petitioner’s Fourth Amended Complaint) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
12
Florida Law Review, Vol. 63, Iss. 5 [2011], Art. 5
http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol63/iss5/5
2011] MAKING BP’S BLOOD CURD-LE 1257 
 
majority’s ruling. First, he opined that the majority’s decision “does not 
extend to distributors, seafood restaurants, fisheries, fish brokers, or the 
like whose incomes may have been affected by Mosaic’s pollution.”98 
However, the majority opinion is far from explicit on this point. Second, he 
made a public policy prophylactic argument that Mosaic owed a duty of 
care to neither the commercial fishermen nor any of the claimants in the 
class action lawsuit.99 
Despite the fact that Florida effectively eviscerated the economic loss 
rule in claims of negligence six years earlier,100 Justice Polston relied on 
that doctrine’s underpinnings to bolster his assertion. Justice Polston 
focused on the fact that, “[h]ere, the plaintiffs have suffered no personal 
injury. They have suffered no property damage.”101 Justice Polston argued 
that “commercial fishermen in Florida do not have a ‘special’ interest 
within the ‘zone of risk’ the majority finds Mosaic to have created.”102 
Specifically, the justice questioned the majority’s reliance on the licensure 
of the fisherman as a basis for establishing duty.103 He stated that “if every 
state-licensed Floridian has a ‘special’ or ‘unique’ interest, then it seems 
there is endless ‘foreseeable’ liability.”104  
Echoing the learned Judge Cardozo, Justice Polston mapped the 
horizon he feared: “The unrestricted imposition of liability on polluters for 
purely economic damages could create future liability ‘in an indeterminate 
amount for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate class.’”105 Whether 
Justice Polston is deemed to be a soothsayer or Henny Penny106 will likely 
take years of litigation to ascertain.   
C.  The Aftermath: Curd as a Roadmap for BP Claimants 
While it is possible that the majority opinion and Justice Polston’s 
opinion were drafted without a thought to the impending BP Deepwater 
Horizon oil spill litigation, it seems unlikely at best.107 Based on the scope 
of Justice Polston’s opinion, it seems as though he was addressing 
                                                                                                                     
 98. Id.  
 99. See id. at 1230–34. 
 100. See supra Section I.C (discussing Indemnity Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Am. Aviation, Inc., 
891 So. 2d 532 (Fla. 2004)). 
 101. Curd, 39 So. 3d at 1232 (Polston, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 102. Id. at 1233. 
 103. Id. at 1233–34. 
 104. Id. (“[H]otels and restaurants near the beach, seafood truck drivers, beach community 
realtors, and yacht salesmen are all licensed by the State to conduct commercial activities that may 
be negatively affected by pollution of coastal waters.”). 
 105. Id. at 1232 (quoting Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441, 444 (N.Y. 1931)). 
 106. Henny Penny, also known as Chicken Little, is a fable about a chicken who believes the 
world is coming to an end. It is a common idiom indicating a hysterical or mistaken belief that 
disaster is imminent. See, e.g., STEVEN KELLOGG, CHICKEN LITTLE (1985). 
 107. At the time the Curd opinion was handed down, the BP spill had been going on for over 
fifty-eight days and was at the forefront of almost all news coverage, especially in Gulf states, 
including Florida. 
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concerns that spread far beyond the small group affected by Mosaic and the 
small area of Tampa Bay at issue in Curd. His focus was on the state of 
Florida as a whole and the “tens of thousands of Floridians who earn their 
living from healthy ocean waters”108 and via beach tourism across the 
state.109 Looking ahead—and, perhaps, toward the Gulf—Polston saw the 
rising tide of litigation that would result if Curd is read to extend duty too 
far and too wide.  
Despite Justice Polston’s protestations, following Curd, litigants 
claiming damages due to the BP oil spill could easily illustrate that 
commercial fishermen have a common law negligence action against 
polluters in Florida for pure economic losses. Equally true, although 
abhorrent to the justice’s view of jurisprudence, is that Curd’s legal 
rationale could be adapted by plaintiffs’ attorneys to support the conclusion 
that polluters also owe a duty of care to hotels, restaurants, tourism 
industries, theme parks, or other tertiary plaintiffs who fall with the 
“foreseeable zone of risk.” In any litigation stemming from the Deepwater 
Horizon oil spill, this would be almost as simple as substituting the party 
names and a few facts and then following the roadmap to liability provided 
in the majority opinion. 
First, a plaintiff in BP litigation could establish that BP, like Mosaic 
Fertilizer, “created an appreciable zone of risk” and was therefore 
“required to exercise prudent foresight whenever others may be injured as 
a result.”110 Second, a plaintiff could establish that BP’s duty, like Mosaic 
Fertilizer’s duty, “ar[ose] because of a foreseeable zone of risk arising 
from” BP’s actions.111 Therefore, like in Mosaic Fertilizer, BP’s “activities 
created an appreciable zone of risk within which [BP] was obligated to 
protect those who were exposed to harm.”112 Third, it is not a reach to state 
that, like Mosaic Fertilizer, BP’s “business involved the storage [and 
excavation] of pollutants and hazardous contaminants.”113 Fourth, it was 
similarly foreseeable that, were these materials released into the public 
waters, “they would cause damage to marine and plant life as well as to 
human activity.”114 Fifth, these tertiary plaintiffs could establish that they 
“had a special interest within that zone of risk, an interest not shared by the 
                                                                                                                     
 108. Curd, 39 So. 3d at 1233 (Polston, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 109. Id. (citing CTR. FOR URBAN & ENVTL. SOLUTIONS AT FLA. ATL. UNIV., FLORIDA VISITOR 
STUDY 1 (2008); Forrest J. Bass, Calming the Storm: Public Access to Florida’s Beaches in the 
Wake of Hurricane-Related Sand Loss, 38 STETSON L. REV. 541, 570–71 (2009)). 
 110. Id. at 1228 (majority opinion) (quoting McCain v. Fla. Power Corp., 593 So. 2d 500, 503 
(Fla. 1992)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 111. Id. (quoting McCain, 593 So. 2d at 503 n.2) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. The oil sludge from the BP spill contains a bevy of toxins that could include elevated 
levels of polynuclear aromatic hydrocarbons (or PAHs), which could be carcinogenic. See Joshua 
Philipp, BP Oil Spill Taking Toll on Louisiana Indian Tribe, EPOCH TIMES, Oct. 31, 2010, 
http://www.theepochtimes.com/n2/content/view/45131/.  
 114.  Curd, 39 So. 3d at 1228 (citing McCain, 593 So. 2d at 503 n.2) (emphasis added).  
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general community.”115  
Hotels and resorts, much like commercial fishermen, are licensed and 
heavily regulated by the state of Florida.116 While the vast majority of such 
tertiary plaintiffs are not licensed “to conduct commercial activities in the 
waters” of the state, as were fishermen in Curd,117 many certainly conduct 
activities along or near those waters and, like the Curd fishermen, “[are] 
dependent on those waters to earn their livelihood.”118  
Finally, like Mosaic Fertilizer, BP’s “activities placed the [tertiary 
plaintiff’s] peculiar interests directly within the zone of risk created by”119 
BP’s activities. “As a result, [BP] was obligated to exercise prudent 
foresight and take sufficient precautions to protect that interest.”120 
Therefore, a well-plead claim with Curd as binding precedent would leave 
no other alternative than to conclude that BP owed hotels, restaurants, and 
other similarly situated plaintiffs a duty of care for pure economic losses 
arising from the BP oil spill.  
This is not to say that such an argument is unassailable. To be certain, 
many high-priced law firms may gladly fill many a billable hour 
pontificating on just how “peculiar” a plaintiff’s interests must be to be 
worthy of such a duty of care. But Curd presents a far more pressing 
problem for the judiciary. Even assuming, arguendo, that the herd would 
be thinned by plaintiffs unable to establish proper damages, the liberalizing 
of the duty requirement will, at a minimum, give fresh sets of keys to the 
courthouse doors to litigants. Simply put, cases which would have 
previously been dismissed at the early stages of litigation for failure to state 
a cause of action on an element based on the law (i.e., the existence of a 
duty) will now be required to see a jury to decide those issues based on the 
facts (i.e., proximate causation and damages). These practical changes in 
litigation posture will provide leverage to plaintiffs and increase the 
pressure on wealthy defendants to settle.  
Given the implications of its decision to even expound on the common 
law duty issue, it seems unfathomable that the learned justices of the 
Florida Supreme Court failed to pay it any consideration. Certainly, the 
court simply could have found a statutory cause of action (which they 
unanimously did) and held that this obviated the need to address the 
common law liability. The court has employed this method of judicial 
avoidance in many cases, and it would have been a far more prudent 
                                                                                                                     
 115. Id. (citing Union Oil Co. v. Oppen, 501 F.2d 558, 568 (9th Cir. 1974)). 
 116. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 509.241 (West 2010) (requiring, under criminal penalty, the 
licensure of hotels and restaurants by the state of Florida).  
 117. Curd, 39 So. 3d at 1228 (emphasis added). 
 118. Id. The Florida Supreme Court would be injudicious to base its distinction between the 
commercial fishermen in Curd and such tertiary plaintiffs solely on the fact that the tertiary 
plaintiffs’ businesses are situated in the waters rather than alongside the waters.   
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. (citing Kaisner v. Kolb, 543 So. 2d 732, 735 (Fla. 1989)). 
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posture to take in Curd.121 This would hardly have affected the claims, 
since the broad damages permitted under Florida Statutes § 376.313 
include “all damages resulting from a discharge or other condition of 
pollution” covered by further statutes.122  
As stated above, due to the jurisdictional constraints in Florida’s 
constitution,123 the court was restricted to answering the specific question 
asked about claims of commercial fishermen. Because Florida’s Second 
District Court of Appeal did not ask, the Supreme Court could not opine on 
whether Mosaic owed a duty of care for the pure economic damages of 
non-commercial fishermen or any other tertiary plaintiffs for that matter. 
However, there is a fine line between obeying the constitutional limitations 
and treading in waters that could have been easily traversed. 
Another foreseeable effect of this decision is that the Florida Supreme 
Court cannot, sua sponte, grant certiorari to rehear this matter. The 
precedent is set and is now wholly binding in Florida.  At issue is the 
freedom of lower courts to limit its application specifically to commercial 
fishermen or expand it to tertiary plaintiffs. It will take either varied 
application of the precedent by, and unequal justice in, the lower courts 
(conflict jurisdiction) or another district court of appeal certifying an “on 
all fours” question for the Florida Supreme Court to ever again address this 
issue. Hence, the question of just how far duty will extend in these cases 
remains open and will likely take years of litigation before being answered. 
Whether or not liability proves to be extended in a way that Justice Polston 
suggested, one incontrovertible result of the Curd decision is that potential 
claimants asserting purely economic losses as a result of the BP oil spill 
now seem to have sounder footing for their negligence-based claims in the 
courts of the state of Florida. Therefore, if venue can be established, this 
decision appears to signal a green light to BP claimants who want to try 
their luck under Florida law. 
 
 
                                                                                                                     
 121. See, e.g., Raborn v. Menotte, 974 So. 2d 328, 332 (Fla. 2008) (“Having answered this 
first question, we decline to answer the second certified question as it is moot.”); T.M. v. State, 784 
So. 2d 442, 444 (Fla. 2001) (“Because the district court applied heightened rather than strict 
scrutiny we remand this case for further consideration. We decline to address the remaining issues 
raised by the parties.”); J.A. v. State, 788 So. 2d 953, 954 (Fla. 2001) (citing T.M. in declining 
second question); Fawcett v. State, 615 So. 2d 691, 692 (Fla. 1993) (“We find the first certified 
question irrelevant and moot in light of our disposition of the second question, and we thus decline 
to answer it.”).  
 122. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 376.313(3) (West 2011) (emphasis added).  
 123. For instance, Florida’s high court does not have certiorari powers akin to the U.S. 
Supreme Court. See Haines City Comm. Dev. v. Heggs, 658 So. 2d 523, 525 n.2 (Fla. 1995). 
Instead, the court may hear matters only as specifically delineated in its state’s constitution. FLA. 
CONST. art. V, § 3(b). In Curd, the Florida Supreme Court had jurisdiction because a lower 
appellate court presented it with a question of great public importance. Curd, 39 So. 3d at 1218; see 
also FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(4). 
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III.  VENUE SHOPPING: COMPARING THE PROSPECTS FOR POTENTIAL BP 
CLAIMANTS ACROSS THE AFFECTED GULF STATES 
The Gulf states directly affected by the BP oil spill—Alabama, 
Louisiana, Texas, Mississippi, and Florida—and their federal circuits—the 
Fifth and Eleventh Circuits—take varied approaches to the economic loss 
rule, especially in the contexts likely to arise in BP litigation. Florida’s 
Curd opinion overwhelmingly represents a break from its fellow Gulf 
states, liberally opening the door for claims that heretofore would not have 
survived summary judgment. Regardless, variations among these states’ 
and circuits’ common law principles could dramatically affect who is 
compensated and for what injuries in BP litigation. The following analysis 
attempts the first comprehensive review of the Gulf states’ adherence to 
the economic loss rule vis-à-vis contexts similar to the current oil spill.  
A.  Eleventh Circuit 
Florida’s federal circuit has taken a much more conservative approach 
to the economic loss rule than the Florida Supreme Court. For nearly three 
decades, the Eleventh Circuit steadfastly has held to the economic loss rule 
with the exception for commercial fishermen.  
In Kingston Shipping Co. v. Roberts, 124 the new Eleventh Circuit125 
adopted with little discussion the Robins rule, limiting recovery in tort to 
only those instances of injury or damage to property.126 In Kingston, a main 
ship channel in Tampa Bay was closed for nearly a month after a ship 
collided with a U.S. Coast Guard buoy tender, sinking the latter in the 
waterway.127 Delayed vessels sought damages as a result of the holdups in 
entering or leaving the port of Tampa.128 In affirming the district court’s 
ruling, the Eleventh Circuit held that the vessels failed to state a cause of 
action, noting that “a party may not recover economic losses not associated 
with physical damages.”129 The court held the same in a subsequent case 
involving blockage of the Tampa Bay port.130 
The next year, the court recognized a small exception to the economic 
loss rule. In Miller Industries v. Caterpillar Tractor Co.,131 a manufacturer 
sold the plaintiff ship owner a faulty engine that caused the ship to stall at 
sea, delaying its scheduled trip.132 Although the case stemmed from a 
                                                                                                                     
 124. 667 F.2d 34 (11th Cir. 1982) (per curiam).  
 125. See Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals Reorganization Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-452, § 2, 
94 Stat. 1994, 1994 (creating the Eleventh Circuit by splitting the Fifth Circuit). 
 126. Kingston, 667 F.2d at 35 (citing Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint, 275 U.S. 303 
(1927)).  
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Hercules Carriers, Inc. v. Florida, 720 F.2d 1201, 1202 (11th Cir. 1983) (per curiam).  
 131. 733 F.2d 813 (11th Cir. 1984) (per curiam).  
 132. Id. at 815–16.  
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products liability claim, the district court awarded and the Eleventh Circuit 
affirmed damages sounding in tort, namely, lost profits of uncaptured fish 
of its crew members who intervened in the case despite not being in privity 
of contract with the defendant.133  
Citing the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit’s Union Oil Co. 
v. Oppen decision, the Eleventh Circuit adopted a commercial fishermen 
exception to the economic loss rule.134 A key rationale for the court’s 
decision was that the injury to commercial fishermen—who make their 
living from and are trained in the enterprise of catching fish—from such a 
tortious act was “neither remote nor a speculative injury.”135 Furthermore, 
these plaintiffs were not the sort that would be unknown to the tortfeasor, 
as injury to their ability to catch fish would be a foreseeable harm of such 
tortious activity.136 In essence, the court held that the justifications for 
limiting pure economic losses to preclude an indeterminate class for an 
indeterminate time did not apply to commercial fishermen, who would be 
foreseeable victims of such tortious activity. In the BP context, it is likely 
that the Eleventh Circuit also would find a commercial fishermen 
exception, allowing recovery for demonstrated economic damages 
associated with the spill as those injuries would be just as foreseeable as 
the fishermen in Miller Industries, if not more. With respect to more 
remote or speculative damages to restaurants or hotels, however, those 
injuries would likely not qualify for the exception in this circuit. Since its 
early cases, the Eleventh Circuit has not demonstrated any move away 
from the Robins rule in this respect or from the limited commercial 
fishermen exception. 
B.  Alabama 
The state with the least amount of coastline affected by the BP oil 
spill,137 Alabama, also has the fewest court decisions analyzing the 
economic loss rule in this or similar contexts. Alabama state courts have 
cited Robins only once138 and have never considered the Ninth Circuit’s 
application of the commercial fishermen exception in published 
opinions.139 Alabama state decisions and commentary140 support the 
                                                                                                                     
 133. Id. at 816, 818, 823. 
 134. Id. at 819–20 (citing Union Oil Co. v. Oppen, 501 F.2d 558, 567 (9th Cir. 1974)).  
 135. Id. at 820. 
 136. Id. 
 137. All Things Considered: Notable Numbers from the Gulf Oil Spill (NPR radio broadcast 
Aug. 3, 2010), available at 2010 WLNR 15436369.  
 138. This analysis was based on a Westlaw Keycite search in May 2011. The single Alabama 
state court case discussing or even citing to Robins was Ziegler v. Blount Bros. Construction Co., 
364 So. 2d 1163, 1166–67 (Ala. 1978).  
 139. This analysis was based on a Westlaw Keycite search in November 2010.  
 140. See, e.g., Commentary, Recovery of Economic Damages Under the Alabama Extended 
Manufacturer’s Liability Doctrine, 35 ALA. L. REV. 329, 346 (1984) (“[W]hat would the court’s 
view on recovery of economic damages likely be? Because the court continues to retain the 
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conclusion that Alabama is likely to apply stringently the economic loss 
rule to BP litigation claims.  
In Ziegler v. Blount Bros. Construction Co., the Alabama Supreme 
Court essentially applied the principles of the economic loss rule when 
residents of a town sought economic damages against a contractor for its 
tortious construction of the Walter Bouldin Dam.141 The town’s residents 
claimed, under theories of third-party beneficiary and negligence, that the 
defendant should have known its tortious conduct in constructing a dam 
that later collapsed would lead to increases in their utility costs.142 First, 
regarding the third-party beneficiary theory, the court found that the 
purpose of the contract for the dam’s construction was not to benefit the 
town’s residents who would consume the additional electricity.143 Instead, 
the residents were merely “incidental beneficiaries who claim the loss of an 
economic benefit.”144 More importantly, the court held that the defendant 
owed the plaintiffs no duty of care for their pure economic losses. In sum, 
the court reasoned that it was remote and not “reasonably foreseeable” that 
errors in construction of the dam would lead to the state’s implementation 
of a rate-increasing clause to obtain electricity from another source.145  
This result and results in Alabama products liability claims146 illustrate 
that Alabama holds firm to the economic loss rule. Whether an exception 
for commercial fishermen under the economic loss rule exists in this state 
remains unclear. However, based on its strict adherence to the rule in the 
Bouldin Dam case and little sign of retreat since then, the Alabama 
Supreme Court certainly has a much less liberal view of the economic loss 
doctrine than the Florida Supreme Court. If residents were not the intended 
beneficiaries of the contract designed to provide them with electricity, then 
certainly charter boats, beach vendors, hotels, resorts, or amusement parks 
would not qualify as intended beneficiaries of any contractual or tort duty 
of BP to drill in a non-negligent manner.  
C.  Fifth Circuit 
The circuit likely to field many of the BP claims is the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, whose jurisdiction includes Mississippi, 
Louisiana, and Texas. The “Oil Circuit” may prove to be the most perilous 
for plaintiffs bringing claims against BP arising from the Deepwater 
Horizon spill.147 Unlike the Ninth and other circuits, the Fifth Circuit has 
                                                                                                                     
distinction between recovery in tort and recovery in contract, it is unlikely that the court would 
undercut the provisions of contract law in favor of recovery in tort.”). 
 141. Ziegler, 364 So. 2d at 1164–65. 
 142. Id. at 1165, 1167. 
 143. Id. at 1166.  
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. at 1167–68. 
 146. See, e.g., Lloyd Wood Coal Co. v. Clark Equip. Co., 543 So. 2d 671, 672 (Ala. 1989).  
 147. See Michael Kunzelman, New Orleans Judge to Handle Most Gulf Oil Spill Lawsuits, 
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adhered religiously to the economic loss rule, providing no true exception 
for commercial fishermen despite repeated opportunities to revisit its 
holding. 
Although many—even BP—argue that the Fifth Circuit recognizes the 
commercial fishermen exception to the rule barring damages for economic 
losses absent a physical injury,148 a close reading of circuit decisions 
suggests otherwise. The genesis of this misperception is Louisiana ex rel. 
William J. Guste v. M/V Testbank (M/V Testbank I).149 Two vessels 
collided near the Mississippi River Gulf Outlet, dropping twelve tons of a 
highly toxic chemical—pentaclorophenol (PCP)—into the waterway while 
drums of hydrobromic acid and ethyl mercaptan were lost overboard or 
ruptured.150 As a result, the U.S. Coast Guard shut off portions of 
Louisiana waterways and marshes to commercial fishermen.151 The 
plaintiffs sued the vessel owners under numerous theories, including 
maritime tort.152 
The district court judge noted the Fifth Circuit’s “steadfast” adherence 
to the economic loss rule before rejecting its application to commercial 
fishermen.153 The judge relied primarily on similar exceptions carved out 
by other jurisdictions that held that commercial fishermen had a special 
interest that the tortious defendants had a duty not to harm negligently.154 
In sum, the judge noted that the defendants caused “a tortious invasion that 
interfered with the special interest of the commercial fishermen, crabbers, 
                                                                                                                     
ASSOCIATED PRESS, Aug. 10, 2010, available at 2010 WLNR 16307871 (noting that the U.S. 
Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation ordered a Louisiana judge to hear seventy-seven cases and 
potentially 200 related claims). The panel wrote, “Without discounting the spill’s effects on other 
states, if there is a geographic and psychological ‘center of gravity’ in this docket, then the Eastern 
District of Louisiana is closest to it,” according to the Associated Press. Id. (internal quotation 
marks omitted). Furthermore, regardless of whether it actually interferes with judicial independence, 
it is noteworthy that media reports have repeatedly documented the Fifth Circuit’s ties to Big Oil. 
Id. (reporting that only four New Orleans-based judges could hear the case because others have 
recused themselves partially due to their “oil and gas industry investments” and that another judge 
owned corporate bonds issued by two of the BP defendants); see also Rebecca Mowbray, Drilling 
Ban in Standoff; Case Will Return to Court This Morning, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans, La.), 
June 24, 2010, at A08, available at 2010 WLNR 12815655 (placing the number of New Orleans 
judges who recused themselves at seven out of twelve district court judges); ALLIANCE FOR JUSTICE, 
JUDICIAL GUSHER: THE FIFTH CIRCUIT’S TIES TO OIL 8–9 (2010), available at www.afj.org/about-
afj/press/fifth_circuit_ judges_report.pdf (documenting alleged investments and ties to oil of Fifth 
Circuit judges). 
 148. See, e.g., BP Defendants’ Memorandum of Law in Support of Their Motion to Dismiss 
Plaintiffs’ Complaint at 24, Marine Horizons, Inc. v. BP PLC, No. 1:10-cv-00227-WS-N (S.D. Ala. 
July 12, 2010), 2010 WL 2771473 (discussing “one very narrow exception to the Robins Dry Dock 
rule”).  
 149. La. ex rel. Guste v. M/V Testbank (M/V Testbank I), 524 F. Supp. 1170 (E.D. La. 1981). 
 150. Id. at 1171 & n.1. 
 151. Id. at 1171. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. at 1172, 1174. 
 154. Id. at 1173 (citing Union Oil Co. v. Oppen, 501 F.2d 558 (9th Cir. 1974); Burgess v. M/V 
Tamano, 370 F. Supp. 247 (S.D. Me. 1973); Masonite Corp. v. Steede, 23 So. 2d 756 (Miss. 1945) 
(en banc); Hampton v. N.C. Pulp Co., 27 S.E.2d 538 (1943)). 
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shrimpers and oystermen to use those public waters to earn their 
livelihood.”155 Accordingly, when the judge granted summary judgment 
against the plaintiffs seeking relief for economic damages not associated 
with a physical injury or contract, the judge did not include “commercial 
fishermen, oystermen, crabbers and shrimpers” who routinely operated on 
the closed waterways as defined by the Coast Guard. This allowed 
commercial fishermen, but not the other plaintiffs, to continue in the 
litigation.156  
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s opinion 
twice—in a per curiam decision (M/V Testbank II)157 and an en banc ruling 
(M/V Testbank III).158 Importantly, these appeals concerned the district 
court’s grant of summary judgment against the non-fishermen plaintiffs in 
M/V Testbank I.159 Therefore, M/V Testbank II and M/V Testbank III did 
not pass judgment on or endorse the commercial fishermen exception in 
M/V Testbank I made by a lone district court judge. Moreover, the rationale 
of the en banc Fifth Circuit decision strongly indicates that even the claims 
of the commercial fishermen must yield to the economic loss rule.   
Sitting en banc, the Fifth Circuit reaffirmed its endorsement of the 
economic loss rule on the grounds that anything less than a categorical bar 
to recovering economic losses absent damages to the plaintiff’s person or 
property would be unworkable. “Ultimately we conclude that without this 
limitation foreseeability loses much of its ability to function as a rule of 
law.”160 The rule “is a pragmatic limitation on the doctrine of 
foreseeability, a limitation we find to be both workable and useful.”161 The 
court went on: “The explanation . . . is a pragmatic one: the physical 
consequences of negligence usually have been limited, but the indirect 
economic repercussions of negligence may be far wider, indeed virtually 
open-ended.”162 “[W]e disagree with a case-by-case approach because we 
think the value of a rule is significant in these maritime decisions.”163 In 
addition, the court refused to recognize a public nuisance exception to sue 
polluters because of the “problem” in “determining which foreseeable 
damages are too remote to justify recovery in negligence.”164  
                                                                                                                     
 155. Id. at 1174. 
 156. Id. 
 157. La. ex rel. Guste v. M/V Testbank (M/V Testbank II), 728 F.2d 748, 750 (5th Cir. 1984) 
(per curiam).  
 158. La. ex rel. Guste v. M/V Testbank (M/V Testbank III), 752 F.2d 1019, 1032 (5th Cir. 
1985) (en banc).  
 159. Id. at 1021 n.2 (“The rights of commercial fishermen who survived summary judgment 
are not before us.”). 
 160. Id. at 1021. 
 161. Id. at 1032. 
 162. Id. at 1022 (quoting Fleming James, Jr., Limitations on Liability for Economic Loss 
Caused by Negligence: A Pragmatic Appraisal, 25 VAND. L. REV. 43, 45 (1972)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 163. Id. at 1026. 
 164. Id. at 1030. 
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Recognizing a commercial fishermen exception would introduce the 
same unpredictability in the stream of liability and application of tort 
concepts, such as foreseeability, that the Fifth Circuit sought to extract in 
M/V Testbank III. To illustrate, even limiting the class of plaintiffs excused 
from the economic loss rule to commercial fishermen proves troublesome 
under that rationale: Who will qualify as a “commercial fishermen”? For 
how long must those plaintiffs have used affected waterways for the 
defendants to have owed them a duty of care? Which damages of the 
commercial fishermen would be covered? And for how long can 
commercial fishermen recover for dead fish even after they are physically 
able to return to the seas?165 
Clearly, though, the Fifth Circuit was not in unison in excluding the 
commercial fishermen claims. The court noted a “substantial argument can 
be made” that commercial fishermen have a proprietary interest in fish that 
would effectively save those plaintiffs from the rule’s administration.166 
Alternatively, the court noted its decision would sidestep extending the 
Ninth Circuit’s commercial fishermen exception adopted in M/V Testbank 
I.167 In fact, two of the judges concurring in the judgment demonstrated at 
most a sympathy for the commercial fishermen or at least an unwillingness 
to close the rule to any exceptions.168 Still, another concurring judge noted 
the infeasibility of the courts to administer a non-categorical rule.169 
Moreover, even the dissent acknowledged that notwithstanding the 
majority’s supposed reservations in the breadth of its ruling, M/V Testbank 
III was contrary to the Ninth Circuit’s exception for commercial 
fishermen.170 Ultimately, though, the Fifth Circuit concluded that “today’s 
decision does not foreclose free consideration by a court panel of the 
claims of commercial fishermen.”171 
But in the twenty-five years since M/V Testbank III, the Fifth Circuit 
has yet to recognize such an exception.172 In fact, in 2006 the Fifth Circuit 
                                                                                                                     
 165. See infra text accompanying notes 213–15 (discussing Texas rule that limits damages of 
commercial fishermen to the period in which they were denied the opportunity to fish rather than 
allowing a claim for feral fish otherwise uncaught).  
 166. M/V Testbank III, 752 F.2d at 1027 n.10. 
 167. Id. (referencing Union Oil Co. v. Oppen, 501 F.2d 558 (9th Cir. 1974)). 
 168. Id. at 1034 (Williams, J., concurring) (“The commercial fishermen properly recover 
because their livelihood comes from a ‘resource’ of the water which was polluted. Yet, physical 
property owned by them was not damaged and it is doubtful that a proprietary interest could have 
been shown.”); see also id. at 1035 (Garwood, J., concurring) (“I am in full accord with the 
desirability of a general rule in accordance with the principles stated by [the en banc decision], and 
for the reasons . . . articulate[d]. However, we need not in this case either foreclose, or define the 
precise contours of, possible rare exceptions.”). 
 169. Id. at 1032–34 (Gee, J., concurring). 
 170. Id. at 1043 (Wisdom, J., dissenting). 
 171. Id. at 1027 (en banc).  
 172. However, similar to the varied decisions of the M/V Testbank III judges, views on the 
exception for commercial fishermen have not been uniform within the Fifth Circuit’s jurisdiction. 
See Shaughnessy v. PPG Indus., Inc., 795 F. Supp. 193, 196 (W.D. La. 1992); see also Tamara 
Dixon, Note, Recovery of Economic Loss Absent Physical Damage to a Proprietary Interest: Does 
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overturned its lower court’s adoption of an exception and added: “While 
other jurisdictions may have abandoned or relaxed the bright line rule of 
Robins and TESTBANK, this circuit has not retreated from TESTBANK’s 
physical injury requirement . . . .”173 There, claimants brought an action 
against a barge owner whose vessel crashed into a bridge and released a 
toxic gas that resulted in the evacuation of businesses and residents.174 
While dismissing the district court’s commercial fishermen exception on 
technical grounds,175 the Fifth Circuit noted that M/V Testbank III 
dismissed a “case-by-case approach” to unintentional maritime torts, and 
the court reiterated its commitment to the economic loss rule.176   
Granted, the waters are murky on whether the Fifth Circuit would 
uphold a commercial fishermen exception in BP lawsuits, although that 
question may not even make it to the circuit’s docket.177 On the larger 
issue, though, the Fifth Circuit likely will not sustain claims from periphery 
plaintiffs whose alleged non-proprietary damages due to the BP oil spill are 
too remote to deserve compensation under maritime law.  
An important caveat to the Fifth Circuit jurisprudence should be noted. 
Prior to the Testbank rulings, in at least two instances, Fifth Circuit courts 
ruled in favor of plaintiffs where no physical damage to their property 
actually occurred.178 In J. Ray McDermott & Co. v. S.S. Egero,179 the Fifth 
Circuit found that the plaintiff-contractor was the “owner” of a pipeline 
project that was delayed due to the defendant-shipper’s misplaced 
anchor.180 Also, a federal district court in Louisiana ruled in favor of the 
plaintiffs in a case in which the defendant-shipper caused them additional 
expenses due to the defendant’s collision with canal locks that blocked 
                                                                                                                     
Testbank Dim the Bright-Line?, 46 LA. L. REV. 913, 921 (1986) (“In contrast, the policy issues 
behind Testbank and Union Oil seem to support recognizing the claims of commercial fishermen 
and imposing liability on the defendants.”). In Shaughnessy, the court applied a commercial 
fishermen exception to a fishing and hunting guide business that suffered losses due to pollution of 
Louisiana waters. Shaughnessy, 795 F. Supp. at 194, 196–97. However, the court found that the 
case was distinguishable from the Testbank decisions as it was based on a land-based tort—not a 
maritime tort. Id. at 196.  
 173. In re Taira Lynn Marine Ltd. No. 5, LLC, 444 F.3d 371, 379 (5th Cir. 2006) (internal 
quotation marks omitted) (overruling a district court’s decision that plaintiffs qualified for a 
“commercial fishermen” exception to the Testbank rule based on the grounds that the claims were 
not properly included in a motion for summary judgment). The court’s decision here appears 
spurious. In essence, the court rules against the commercial fishermen, refusing to apply the 
supposed M/V Testbank I exception, because in their application for a grant of summary judgment, 
the plaintiffs claimed that they were “wholesale fishermen,” not “commercial fishermen.” Id. 
 174. Id. at 375–76. 
 175. See supra note 173. 
 176. In re Taira Lynn Marine Ltd., 444 F.3d at 378–79. 
 177. Mary Foster, $20 Billion Oil Fund to Begin Payments in August, ASSOCIATED PRESS FIN. 
WIRE, July 15, 2010 (noting BP’s creation of a $20 billion fund to compensate claimants alleging 
losses due to the BP oil spill and the potential large settlements with commercial fishermen). 
 178. Dixon, supra note 172, at 918–20. 
 179. 453 F.2d 1202 (5th Cir. 1972). 
 180. Id. at 1203–04. 
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navigable waterways.181 These cases, however, likely would not be 
persuasive in undoing the Testbank tenets. Both cases were ignored by the 
majority in M/V Testbank III while cited approvingly by the dissent.182 M/V 
Testbank III likely rendered the decisions devoid of any jurisprudential 
value. A Fifth District appeals or district court has referenced S.S. Ergo in 
only one case183 since M/V Testbank III and has not cited the other district 
court case. Moreover, neither court in those pre-M/V Testbank decisions 
allowed recovery for lost profits,184 which would be at the heart of any 
damage claims by the periphery plaintiffs in BP lawsuits. Looking at the 
Fifth Circuit rules in a vacuum is not desirable. In fact, individual state 
laws and preferences inform the Testbank rule, leading to variation in 
recognition of rights to economic losses among commercial fishermen and 
other plaintiffs. 
D.  Louisiana 
Although the leading Fifth Circuit decision on the economic loss rule 
bubbled up from its borders, Louisiana state courts have broken with the 
per se economic loss rule in lieu of a duty-risk analysis.185 Yet, due to the 
stringent application of the analysis as well as additional common law 
restrictions, Louisiana state law still would provide little solace to private 
BP plaintiffs, including commercial fishermen. Unsurprisingly, in its 
multistate defense, BP argued that if any state’s laws were applicable to oil 
spill claims, they were Louisiana’s, regardless of where the plaintiff’s 
injuries occurred.186 
In one case in which a tortfeasor’s negligent act deprived a plaintiff of 
the benefits of its contract, the Louisiana Supreme Court refused to permit 
the recovery of pure economic loss that the court suggested could have 
resulted in damages “in an indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time 
to an indeterminate class.”187 In PPG Industries, Inc. v. Dean Dredging, a 
dredging contractor working on Louisiana’s Calcasieu River damaged a 
                                                                                                                     
 181. In re Lyra Shipping Co., Ltd., 360 F. Supp. 1188, 1189, 1191–92 (E.D. La. 1973). 
 182. La. ex rel. Guste v. M/V Testbank, 752 F.2d 1019, 1020–32 (5th Cir. 1985) (en banc); id. 
at 1041 & n.15 (Wisdom, J., dissenting).  
 183. Tex. E. Transmission Corp. v. McMoRan Offshore Exploration Co., 877 F.2d 1214 (5th 
Cir. 1989). 
 184. S.S. Egero, 453 F.2d at 1204; Lyra Shipping, 360 F. Supp. at 1192. 
 185. Shelly F. Spansel, Comment, Robins Dry Dock Versus State Laws Governing Liability for 
Pure Economic Loss: How the Maritime Circuit Should Resolve the Preemption Conflict, 51 LOY. 
L. REV. 165, 172 (2005). 
 186. See, e.g., BP Defendants’ Memorandum of Law in Support of Their Motion to Dismiss 
Plaintiff’s Complaint at 21 n.5, Marine Horizons, Inc. v. BP PLC, No. 1:10-cv-00227-WS-N (S.D. 
Ala. July 12, 2010), 2010 WL 2771473 (“Thus, the State of Louisiana is adjacent to the accident 
site, and its laws may govern certain claims arising from the incident absent applicable federal law 
or any inconsistencies between Louisiana law and federal law.”). 
 187. PPG Indus., Inc. v. Dean Dredging, 447 So. 2d 1058, 1061 (La. 1984) (quoting 
Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441, 444 (N.Y. 1931)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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natural gas line owned by Texaco.188 The plaintiff in the case was not 
Texaco or a subsidiary but a third party who relied on the gas line to run its 
manufacturing plant, PPG Industries.189 Due to the gas line damage, the 
plaintiff bought natural gas from another source and at a higher price and 
later filed suit against the dredger.190 
Although repeatedly acknowledging that the defendant-dredger acted 
“negligently,” the court found that “[r]ules of conduct are designed to 
protect some persons under some circumstances against some risks.”191 In 
adopting a case-by-case, duty-risk analysis, Louisiana’s high court looked 
to policy considerations and at the “ease of association between the rule of 
conduct, the risk of injury, and the loss sought to be recovered.”192 While 
the court acknowledged an ease of association between the rule not to 
negligently damage another’s property and the damage to Texaco’s 
pipeline, the court found no similar association between that rule and 
protecting a third party’s contract interest in the damaged property.193 
Therefore, the court ruled against the plaintiff. 
PPG Industries, Inc. is profound not for its holding but for its 
abandonment of a per se bar on pure economic loss.194 The fact that the 
court found the plaintiff’s contract interest in the damaged property too 
remote to deserve protection is an indicator that plaintiffs alleging 
economic losses in their tourism or restaurant industries due to 
environmental damage from BP’s oil spill also will fail the duty-risk 
analysis. In fact, post-PPG Industries, Inc., Louisiana state courts have 
been reluctant to recognize pure economic losses—including those of 
commercial fishermen—unlike other Gulf states.195 
In Phillips v. G&H Seed Co.,196 a Louisiana appeals court overturned a 
jury verdict in favor of crawfish purchasers and processors after the 
defendants coated their food with a product that killed or sterilized the 
crustaceans.197 The defendants settled with the crawfish farmers, but not 
                                                                                                                     
 188. Id. at 1060.  
 189. Id.  
 190. Id. 
 191. Id. at 1061. But see Maddox v. Int’l Paper Co., 47 F. Supp. 829, 831 (W.D. La. 1942) 
(holding that “future profits from a business, reduced or destroyed by the act of another, are 
allowable”). 
 192. PPG Indus., Inc., 447 So. 2d at 1061. 
 193. Id. 
 194. Rebecca L. Lear, Comment, Negligent Interference with Contract—An Argument Against 
Categorical Rejection: Applying a Duty/Risk Analysis to Negligent Drug Testing, 60 LA. L. REV. 
855, 860 (2000). But see TS & C Investments, L.L.C. v. Beusa Energy, Inc., 637 F. Supp. 2d 370, 
374–75 (W.D. La. 2009) (“Both the Louisiana Supreme Court and the federal Fifth Circuit have 
adopted the Robins Dry Dock rule in the context of an unintentional maritime tort.”). Although the 
Louisiana Supreme Court’s PPG Industries, Inc. holding fell in line with the economic loss rule, the 
court clearly applied a duty-risk analysis in deciding the case. PPG Industries, Inc., 447 So. 2d at 
1061. 
 195. See Lear, supra note 194, at 860.   
 196. 10 So. 3d 339 (La. App. 2009). 
 197. Id. at 344. 
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with plaintiffs under contract to purchase the farmers’ crawfish.198 The 
purchasers and processors then brought a products liability action against 
the defendants for harming the crawfish industry.199 
Although the trial judge found that “the economic damages to the entire 
crawfish industry in general and these plaintiffs in particular was 
foreseeable consequence [sic] of the damage to the crawfish crop caused 
by [the defendant’s] negligence,” the appeals court, citing nearly the entire 
holding of PPG Industries, Inc., ruled otherwise.200 As in PPG Industries, 
Inc., the court found that the plaintiffs’ lack of a property interest in the 
damaged entity—here, the crawfish—necessitated a finding that the 
plaintiff stated no cause of action.201 The court found that the damaged 
crawfish were the property of the farmers—not the plaintiff-purchasers.202  
A common strain in Phillips and other Louisiana opinions that will 
likely be determinative in claims of commercial fishermen against BP is 
the denial of a private property interest in natural resources or wildlife. As 
noted in Barasich v. Shell Pipeline Co.,203 local statutory and constitutional 
provisions cut against private plaintiffs claiming ownership over public 
resources.204 For instance, commercial fishermen lost their tort claim for 
lack of such a proprietary interest in wild crawfish when the defendants’ 
dredging and oil and gas exploration activities allegedly destroyed the 
aquatic ecosystem, greatly diminishing the crustaceans.205 Furthermore, the 
Louisiana court of appeals held in the same case that state-endorsed fishing 
licenses do not grant commercial fishermen the requisite proprietary 
                                                                                                                     
 198. Id. at 341.  
 199. Id. at 340–41.  
 200. Id. at 342, 344. 
 201. Id. at 344. 
 202. Id. 
 203. No. 05-4180, 2006 WL 3913403 (E.D. La. Nov. 20, 2006). 
 204. Id. at *5, *7–8.  
The ownership and title to all wild birds, and wild quadrupeds, fish, other aquatic 
life, the beds and bottoms of rivers, streams, bayous, lagoons, lakes, bays, sounds, 
and inlets bordering on or connecting with the Gulf of Mexico within the territory 
or jurisdiction of the state, including all oysters and other shellfish and parts 
thereof grown thereon, either naturally or cultivated, and all oysters in the shells 
after they are caught or taken therefrom, are and remain the property of the state, 
and shall be under the exclusive control of the Wildlife and Fisheries 
Commission . . . . 
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 56:3(A) (West 2011). “The control and supervision of the wildlife of the 
state, including all aquatic life, is vested in the Louisiana Wildlife and Fisheries Commission.” LA. 
CONST. art. IX, § 7(A). Louisiana courts also have recognized the state’s constitution created a 
public trust for the protection and conservation of its natural resources. See, e.g., Save Ourselves, 
Inc. v. La. Envtl. Control Comm’n, 452 So. 2d 1152, 1154 (La. 1984) (citing LA. CONST. art. IX, § 
1). 
 205. La. Crawfish Producers Ass’n-W. v. Amerada Hess Corp., 935 So. 2d 380, 381, 384–85 
(La. App. 2006). 
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interest to state a cause of action.206 This finding is directly at odds with the 
Florida Supreme Court’s decision in Curd, where the mere licensure of 
commercial fishermen seemed enough in and of itself to grant that class a 
legally cognizable cause of action against polluters.207  
Likewise, in Dempster v. Louis Eymard Towing Co., plaintiffs claiming 
the defendants were responsible for the loss of a fishing site also failed to 
state a cause of action.208 There, the defendants’ barges collided on the 
Mississippi River, scattering debris and ruining a fishing site that the 
plaintiffs had relied on for years.209 Still, the court held that the fishermen 
had “no proprietary interest in the fishing site or in anticipated fish caught 
in the future.”210 This judicial reluctance to recognize special protections 
for commercial fisherman is a harbinger of defeat for other possible BP 
plaintiffs. For instance, resorts or hotels that rely on pristine beaches and 
waters would likely fail to state a statutory claim under Louisiana tort law 
under these holdings. First, Louisiana courts could easily determine that no 
ease of association exists between laws prohibiting polluting public waters 
and a hotel’s expectation losses, as the purpose of pollution rules is to 
protect the state’s natural resources, not a plaintiff’s profits. Secondly, 
following the Phillips-Barisch-Dempster line of cases, the court would 
likely summarily hold that since the plaintiffs had no property interest in 
the public’s beaches and waters, no cause of action existed, despite the 
required duty-risk analysis in PPG Industries, Inc.211 
E.  Texas 
Texas federal courts follow the traditional M/V Testbank precedent 
developed by Louisiana federal courts: denying pure economic losses with 
an exception for commercial fishermen. However, relying on state law, the 
Texas federal courts will deny that exception to fishermen who are either 
not licensed by the state or whose losses are not associated with state-
granted licenses; thus, Texas limits the pool of “commercial fishermen” 
who may recover for pollution-related damages and the types of damages 
for which they may recover.212 With respect to both commercial fishermen 
                                                                                                                     
 206. Id. In essence, the court found that the state’s grant of a fishing license is not akin to a 
landowner’s grant of a subsidiary proprietary interest. Instead, the license is a privilege the state 
grants pursuant to its regulatory powers. Id.  
 207. See supra Section II.A. 
 208. Dempster v. Louis Eymard Towing Co., 503 So. 2d 99, 100 (La. App. 1987). 
 209. Id.  
 210. Id. at 102. 
 211. A notable exception to this line of cases is where defendants damaged oyster beds that 
Louisiana leased to plaintiffs. There, the courts have recognized a cognizable property interest to 
which the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty of care not to negligently harm the leasehold. See, 
e.g., Jurisich v. La. S. Oil & Gas Co., 284 So. 2d 173, 178 (La. App. 1973). Therefore, to the extent 
BP’s oil damages resorts’ or hotels’ private beaches or other property, a Louisiana court could 
conceivably find in favor of those plaintiff-owners. 
 212. See, e.g., Golnoy Barge Co. v. M/T Shinoussa, 841 F. Supp. 783, 785 (S.D. Tex. 1993). 
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and other potential plaintiffs, Texas plaintiffs likely face greater difficulty 
than Florida plaintiffs in recovering for pure economic loss.  
As in other jurisdictions, commercial fishermen are not granted a 
special right to feral fish. Instead, Texas fishermen claims are based on the 
denial of their state-granted public right to fish. In Golnoy Barge Co. v. 
M/T Shinoussa, a Texas federal court found, “The commercial fishermen 
recover not for injury to the fish stocks, but for physical interference with 
their opportunity to fish. It is only during the closure period and in the 
closed area that the spill actually interferes with their ability to fish.”213  
In that case, a ship collided with a tank barge, spilling oil into the 
Houston Ship Channel.214 However, the district court found that the 
commercial fishermen could only recover for losses while the adjacent 
Galveston Bay was closed.215 Therefore, under this jurisdictional 
pronouncement, presumably once the bay reopened commercial fishermen 
who could not yield the same number of fish due to a BP-like 
contamination would be uncompensated for those losses. This result would 
severely hinder the traditional protections for commercial fishermen. As 
for other pollution plaintiffs, Texas common law firmly adheres to the 
economic loss rule. As recently as 2009 a state appellate court held, “In tort 
cases where there is an absence of privity of contract or, as in this case, an 
absence of third-party beneficiary status, economic damages are not 
recoverable unless they are accompanied by actual physical injury or 
property damage.”216 Therefore, BP plaintiffs who are successful in 
lodging common law claims in Texas will likely lose unless they can prove 
physical injury or property damage. 
F.  Mississippi 
The Mississippi Supreme Court has yet to formally adopt the economic 
loss rule or define its contours within state law.217 Furthermore, outside the 
context of products liability litigation, it is unclear how Mississippi state 
law’s treatment of economic loss, as developed by its lower courts, would 
affect BP litigation.218 Mississippi case law provides some indication that a 
state tort claim would provide nowhere near the level of relief as would a 
Florida claim following Curd. 
In fact, in the leading Mississippi tort claim to reach the state supreme 
                                                                                                                     
 213. Id. at *3 (emphasis added). 
 214. Golnoy Barge Co. v. M/T Shinoussa, No. 93-2021, 1993 WL 347219, at *1 (5th Cir. Aug. 
19, 1993) (per curiam). 
 215. Golnoy Barge Co., 1993 WL 735038, at *3. 
 216. City of Alton v. Sharyland Water Supply Corp., 277 S.W.3d 132, 152–53 (Tex. App. 
2009). 
 217. Progressive Ins. Co. v. Monaco Coach Corp., No. 1:05-cv-DMR-JMR, 2006 WL 839520, 
at *3 (S.D. Miss. Mar. 29, 2006). 
 218. See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 736 So. 2d 384, 386–88 
(Miss. App. 1999) (upholding economic loss rule in products liability cases). 
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court in this area, Masonite Corp. v. Steede,219 the court’s reasoning 
suggests that even commercial fishermen would not be able to recover for 
their damages under BP litigation. There, the plaintiff’s fishing resort was 
“substantially destroyed” by wood fiber discharges from the defendant’s 
manufacturing plant.220 The plaintiff sued for lost profits after fishermen 
stopped patronizing his resort along the Pascagoula River.221 The court 
ruled in favor of the plaintiff’s claim, finding the defendant liable for the 
destruction of the plaintiff’s business.222 
Two aspects of the Mississippi Court’s ruling, however, could be 
burdensome for commercial fishermen claims. First, both here and 
previously, the Mississippi court has reiterated that no private property 
right exists to wild animals to which a plaintiff may claim a pecuniary 
loss.223 Secondly, as at least one analysis has pointed out, the plaintiff’s 
right to recovery did not merely result from damage to its business but 
damage to its property rights associated with that commercial enterprise.224 
Indeed, the court’s analysis strongly supports this proposition. Although 
the court continually faults the defendant for destroying the plaintiff’s 
fishery,225 the court appears to be referencing the physical location (i.e., the 
plaintiff’s property), as opposed to an abstract commercial enterprise. For 
instance, the plaintiff’s fishery business featured the rental or sale of boats 
and bait and the supply of board and lodgings to patrons.226 Yet, the subject 
of the Mississippi Supreme Court’s attention was on the property interest 
affected by the contamination. The court noted that the “valuable rights” 
destroyed, to which the plaintiff was entitled to compensation, were its 
access to the Pascagoula River and its ability to exclude or allow others.227 
The court also found that:  
                                                                                                                     
 219. Masonite Corp. v. Steede (Masonite II), 23 So. 2d 756 (Miss. 1945) (en banc). 
 220. Masonite Corp. v. Steede (Masonite I), 21 So. 2d 463, 463 (Miss. 1945). The Mississippi 
Supreme Court considered the Masonite Corp. v. Steede case twice in 1945—once in March and 
again in November.  
 221. Id. at 463–64.  
 222. Masonite II, 23 So. 2d at 759.  
 223. Id. at 757–58 (noting that the plaintiff had “valuable rights” that existed from both its 
ability to obtain access to the Pascagoula River and to deny access to others—but not recognizing 
any rights to the fish therein); see also Masonite I, 21 So. 2d at 465 (Griffith, J., concurring) (“The 
tort complained of was that the defendant killed the fish in the Pascagoula River, but plaintiff did 
not own the fish or any legal right or interest therein whatsoever.”); Ex parte Fritz, 38 So. 722, 723 
(Miss. 1905) (“It is perfectly clear that [Fritz] does not own the fish in Horn Lake, and this would 
be true even if he owned the bed of the entire lake and all its waters. Fish are feræ naturæ. They are 
incapable, until actually taken, of absolute ownership, except in artificial lakes or in small ponds 
that are entirely land locked.”). 
 224. 33 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS (THIRD) 163, at § 16 (“Several courts have recognized that 
commercial use is part of a plaintiff’s ‘use and enjoyment’ of property, so that loss in the property’s 
commercial value due to contamination caused by the defendant is compensable.”) (citing Masonite 
II, 23 So. 2d 756 (Miss. 1945) (en banc)).  
 225. Masonite II, 23 So. 2d at 758 (noting the “practical destruction of the [plaintiff’s] 
fishery”). 
 226. Masonite I, 21 So. 2d at 463.  
 227. Masonite II, 23 So. 2d at 757–58. 
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One of the elements of the value of the [plaintiff’s] 
right to permit others to obtain, or exclude others from 
obtaining, access to this river in order to fish therein, was 
to use it to promote a commercial purpose . . . . In order for 
persons permitted by [the plaintiff] to obtain access to the 
river to be enabled to fish therein, they must have fishing 
tackle, bait, boats, and if they remain there for any length of 
time food and lodging, the furnishing of which is so closely 
related to the [plaintiff’s] right to permit persons to obtain 
access to the river on her own terms as to become virtually 
a part of it. If the killing of the fish caused persons to 
discontinue availing themselves of the [plaintiff’s] fishing 
facilities, the principal element of the value of this right of 
the [plaintiff] was destroyed; and she is entitled to damages 
therefor . . . .228 
Therefore, read narrowly, Masonite Corp. is not a complete abrogation 
of the economic loss rule. The contamination resulted in an injury to the 
plaintiff’s property as a result of the near-evisceration of the commercial 
enterprise therein due to the contamination of the river. Nowhere in the 
opinion does it even remotely suggest that all third parties negatively 
impacted by the contamination could claim damages from a defendant-
corporation. Translated into the BP oil spill context—and with no official 
Mississippi adoption of the Ninth Circuit’s commercial fishermen 
exception in Union Oil Co. v. Oppen—Mississippi’s tort protections would 
not aid commercial fishermen, who have no proprietary interest in 
uncaught fish and likely no real property interest that could be directly 
devalued by a contamination. Masonite Corp., however, could conceivably 
assist coastal businesses, such as resorts or hotels, that grant access to the 
Gulf and whose commercial enterprises on this  real property were 
devalued as a direct result of the contamination. 
Beyond mere conjecture, other support exists that Mississippi courts 
have not discarded the economic loss rule. In East Mississippi Electric 
Power Ass’n v. Porcelain Products Co.,229 a federal court in Mississippi 
predicted that Mississippi state courts would uphold the rule.230 Although 
that case was a products liability action involving insulators for power 
lines, the court found that, “Mississippi courts would embrace the rule of 
no recovery in tort for economic damages.”231 Therefore, although 
Mississippi’s rule has not been crystallized by its supreme court, 
Mississippi likely would offer fewer protections than would be afforded 
under Curd. 
                                                                                                                     
 228. Id. at 758 (emphasis added). 
 229. 729 F. Supp. 512 (S.D. Miss. 1990).  
 230. Id. at 514. 
 231. Id. at 517. 
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CONCLUSION 
In two major respects, the Florida Supreme Court has adopted a rule for 
recovery of pure economic losses that is far more inclusive of these claims 
than its fellow Gulf states. This distinction could affect the outcomes of not 
only potential BP litigation, but also other tort suits affecting the Gulf of 
Mexico and other waterways. First, Florida’s high court adopted a 
protection for commercial fishermen that seemingly does not exclude lost 
profits from allowable damages and does not limit losses to only the period 
in which no opportunity to fish existed. Second, beyond merely 
recognizing a commercial fishermen exception to the economic loss rule, 
the Florida Supreme Court also affirmed the use of a “zone of risk” 
analysis for determining whether defendants did, in fact, owe a duty to 
plaintiffs. Justice Polston’s denouncement of the court’s failure to delimit 
the outer bounds of this zone and to identify and limit those parties whose 
interests would be protected may well prove to be noteworthy as future 
litigation unfolds. This uncertainty is unquestionably ripe for further 
clarification by the Florida Supreme Court. If the court fails to do so, 
Florida may become not only the mecca for Gulf pollution litigation, but 
also a jurisdiction where neither potential tortfeasors, nor insurers, nor 
courts know exactly who fits into the indeterminate class. 
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